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This research studies cost and schedule stability in programs that utilize Software 
Resource Data Report (SRDR) reporting standards. We find software programs at the 
Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) level show much lower levels of stability 
than previously published DoD stability research that focused on aircraft. A comparison 
of software development methods found little to no difference between Agile and Plan 
Driven methodologies. Critical Success Factors (CSF) were identified from prior 
literature and used to examine CSCIs from the SRDR dataset. Focusing on schedule or 
cost resulted in different variables showing significance. A CSCI is more likely to remain 
on budget when using a team with a low level of average experience and being judicious 
in your contractor selection. A CSCI is more likely to finish on schedule when a team has 
an average level of experience and Boeing is used as the primary contractor. A CSCI is 
more likely to remain on budget and on schedule when Lockheed Martin is the lead 
contractor and the CSCI is programmed in any language other than C. This research can 
be used by program managers and cost analysts to identify the critical success factors that 
can be utilized in the Department of Defense software environment to create trade off 
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AN ANALYSIS OF STABILITY IN SOFTWARE RESOURCE DATA REPORT 
(SRDR) COMPUTER SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION ITEMS (CSCI) 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
Knowing where performance stability is likely to occur in a project helps identify the 
window of time in which defense procurement officials might positively affect cost and 
schedule outcomes.  Generally speaking, stability in a project occurs when some 
observed aspect (e.g. financial efficiency) of the project no longer fluctuates outside of a 
defined range. Without knowledge of whether stability occurs in a project, DoD project 
managers may waste resources on projects that are unlikely to react to outside stimuli. 
Previous literature (Christensen and Payne 1992, Petter et al., 2014) has identified several 
performance stability properties in a subset of U.S. defense programs. However, software 
development is sufficiently unique that these prior studies yield limited insight into 
whether software projects tend to experience problems and what the proper prognosis 
would be. Recent high-profile software failures such as the Expeditionary Combat 
Support System (ECSS) and the integrated Electronic Health Record system (iEHR) have 
shown that the Air Force has pursued projects for many years only to have the program 
cancelled with little to no capability delivered (Kanaracus, 2012; Ehlay, 2013). The 
subtext is that the Air Force should have known the project was ill-fated. The value of 
this study is to establish significant indicators for those problems which may speak to 
similarly ill fates, so that a program manager may have the confidence to make decisive 
changes.  
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 The DoD’s approach to software development is shifting towards a concept called 
DevSecOps. The DevSecOps construct is comprised of three parts: development (Dev), 
security (Sec), and operations (Ops). DevSecOps introduces security earlier into the 
application development lifecycle and has become the industry best practice for rapid, 
secure software development (Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, 2019). 
The DoD’s movement towards DevSecOps is occurring through a new software 
development venture called the DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Initiative. This initiative 
aims to implement agile software development methodologies, where appropriate, across 
all military branches with the use of open-source software (Department of Defense, Chief 
Information Officer, 2019). In contrast to Agile methods, traditional DoD software 
development practices (e.g. the waterfall method) have much longer development cycles 
(Kannan, 2014). These longer development cycles may mask the identification of issues 
that are causing cost overruns or schedule delays until late in the project’s lifetime. 
Therefore, this research will examine whether the software development methods (e.g. 
agile, waterfall, etc.) employed impacts the existence of cost or schedule stability in a 
software program at the CSCI level. 
 In the DoD, Earned Value Management (EVM) is used to help project managers 
measure project performance. One of the key indicators used to gauge the efficiency of a 
program’s performance is the Cost Performance Index (CPI). Previous research has 
defined cost performance stability as when a project’s CPI does not fluctuate more than 
0.1 positive or negative from the point of stability until the end of the project 
(Christensen and Heise, 1993). According to Christensen and Payne (1992), the 
importance of observing CPI stability includes helping the analyst evaluate the capability 
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of a contractor to recover from a cost overrun.  While most previous stability research has 
focused on cost and using EVM data, some research has used analogous methods when 
EVM data is not available or when cost is not the only issue of concern for a project. 
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds are used by Congress as an indicator of when an MDAP 
experiences a cost overrun. The SRDR dataset being examined is at the CSCI level while 
EVM data is only given at the contract and Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) level. In 
the absence of EVM data, these thresholds will be used to indicate breaches in stability 
and will be discussed in depth further in this paper. Depending on the stability results of 
this research, along with the aforementioned movement towards the DoD Enterprise 
DevSecOps Initiative, the findings here may also suggest that current software 
development methods should transition to an Agile (or other) approach.  
Problem Statement 
The purpose of this research is to examine DoD software programs at the CSCI 
level for the existence of stability and, if found, determine how often this occurs. The 
second objective of this research is to determine whether the existence of stability occurs 
more or less often in agile software development methodologies than when using 
traditional Plan Driven software development methodologies. The third objective of this 
research is to identify which critical success factors in DoD software programs at the 
CSCI level improve stability, resulting in more accurate budgets and less cost and 
schedule overruns. The benefits of this research are timely with the DoD increasingly 
focusing on the implementation of DevSecOps in software acquisitions. For an over-
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budget program, having statistical evidence that a program’s cost performance is unlikely 
to improve can inform decisions for potential reallocation of scarce resources.  
Research Questions 
1. What is the extent of cost and schedule stability in DoD software intensive 
programs at the CSCI level?  
2. What differences in cost and schedule stability properties exist between 
software development methodologies? 
3. What DoD Software program critical success factors impact the existence 
of cost and schedule stability?  
Methodology 
The Software Resource Data Report (SRDR) Dataset from the Cost Assessment 
Data Enterprise (CADE) portal is used to identify which CSCIs are included in the 
analysis. Answering the first research question necessitates a definition of stability. As 
EVM data does not currently exist for SRDR programs at the CSCI level, Nunn-
McCurdy thresholds will be used instead. The SRDR dataset uses initial and final reports, 
meaning the thresholds for Original Baseline Estimates will be used. The current 
thresholds are 30% and greater for a Significant Breach and 50% and greater for a 
Critical Breach (Schwartz, 2010). 
The second part of the analysis uses hypothesis tests to identify differences 
between software development categories. The specific hypothesis test employed will 
depend on whether the assumption of normality is met. ANOVA and Tukey analysis are 
used if the data is normally distributed while the Kruskal-Wallis and Steel Dwass tests 
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are used if the assumption of normality fails. The comparison analysis will be expanded 
to control for factors such as software methodology (Plan Driven Vs Agile) to see what 
differences in stability properties exist between software development methodologies. 
The final part of this analysis determines the program characteristics that influence 
stability. The analysis employs contingency tables with CSCIs grouped into either 
“stable” or “unstable” based on the analysis done in part one. Through a literature review, 
program critical success factors are identified and incorporated as variables in the 
contingency tables. 
Scope and Limitations 
Data collections relies on the information contained in submitted 3026s from 
CADE. This analysis will focus on SRDR CSCIs coded as either unstable or stable 
CSCIs. Within the CADE database, limitations will occur due to lack of complete data 
and reporting inconsistencies by contractors, causing some CSCIs to be excluded from 
the final analysis. Furthermore, findings may be limited due to limited sample size of 
CSCIs using Agile processes. 
Thesis Overview 
The following section of this research, Chapter 2, provides relevant analysis into 
what defines SRDR programs as well as a literature review of critical success factors in 
DoD software programs. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of the research and how 
modern DoD software program data at the CSCI level will be used to examine possible 
stability properties. Chapter 4 contains all results of the analysis and any significant 
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findings. The last chapter, Chapter 5, summarizes the preceding chapters, states the 



















II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This literature review explores the prior work conducted on cost and schedule 
stability research, discusses the various software developmental methodologies in use 
today, and identifies critical success factors in program management. First, an 
introduction of the Earned Value Management (EVM) System, how Cost Performance 
Index (CPI) and Schedule Performance Index (SPI) are used to evaluate the efficiency of 
programs, and how EVM measures have been used in prior research is provided. Then, 
alternative evaluation methods of efficiency such as the use of Nunn-McCurdy thresholds 
are explored. Next, the historical and modern uses of Plan Driven and Agile software 
development methodologies are discussed. Finally, what critical success factors are and 
how they differ between software, military, and civilian programs is identified. 
Earned Value Management (EVM) Overview and the Importance of Stability 
This section explains the literature and background information regarding the 
EVM system as a whole and then focuses on how CPI and SPI are used as an efficiency 
index. First, an introduction of the Earned Value Management (EVM) system, CPI, and 
SPI are provided. Then, an overview of previous research on CPI and SPI stability is 
presented. The overview highlights the issues this thesis addresses, including the 
existence of the CPI “stability rule” and the current lack of stability research in the realm 
of software. While this thesis takes a different approach to stability research, 
understanding prior stability literature is crucial to building a strong base as to the 
importance of cost stability in both the DoD and the civilian sector. 
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EVM Background and Measurements 
According to The DoD EVM Interpretation Guide (EVMIG), the authoritative source for 
EVM interpretive guidance, EVM is used “as a program management tool to provide 
joint situational awareness of program status and to assess the cost, schedule, and 
technical performance of programs for proactive course correction” (EVMIG, 2019)  
Present day EVM requirements originated in 1967 with the Cost/Schedule Control 
Systems Criteria (C/SCSC), a list of 35 criteria that contractors had to meet when under a 
contract with the US Government (Fleming and Koppelman, 1998: 19). Previous stability 
research has focused on EVM data. The main EVM components of interest for stability 
research are the CPI and the SPI. The CPI comes from dividing the Actual Cost of Work 
Performed (ACWP) from the Budgeted Cost for Work Performed (BCWP). The SPI 
comes from dividing the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) from the Budgeted 
Cost for Work Scheduled (BCWS). The BCWP, also called the “earned value,” is the 
budgeted cost received for the total work completed. The BCWS is the “planned value” 
and is how much budgeted value the program should have gained so far and ACWP is the 
actual cost that the work incurred (DCMA, 2019: 66). Table 1 defines these five 
components as well as other main EVM measurements that will augment the research 






Table 1. Summary of EVM Measurements (DCMA, 2019) 
EVM Measurement Meaning Formula 
BCWP The earned value, how much 
budgeted cost the program has 
gained thus far 
Sum of the budgeted cost of 
all 
completed work packages 
ACWP The actual cost of the completed 
work packages thus far 
Sum of actual costs of all 
completed work packages 
BCWS The planned value, how much 
budgeted value the program 
should have gained thus far 
Sum of the budgeted cost of 
all work packages scheduled 
SPI Schedule efficiency of a program BCWP / BCWS 
CPI Cost efficiency of a program BCWP / ACWP 
Schedule Variance 
(SV) 
Difference between planned and 
actual schedule accomplishment 
BAC – BCWP 
Cost Variance (CV) Difference between planned and 
actual cost accomplishment 
BCWP – ACWP 
Cost Efficiency Metric: CPI 
As shown in the chart above, CPI is a cost efficiency measure found by dividing 
the BCWP by the ACWP of a program (DCMA, 2019). Being an efficiency index, CPI 
indicates the value of work performed for every dollar spent on a particular program. An 
underperforming program has a CPI value of less than 1 which would mean said program 
is receiving less than a dollar of value for every dollar spent on the program. An 
overperforming program has a CPI value of more than 1 which would mean said program 
is receiving more than a dollar of value for every dollar spent on said program (DCMA, 
2019).  
The CPI is typically used to track cost performance during a program’s life cycle. 
CPI has valuable uses when calculated with both current and cumulative data. Current 
CPI focuses on using the BCWP and ACWP of the desired current period (week, month, 
quarter, etc.) while cumulative CPI uses the BCWP and ACWP of a program from 
beginning to present day. One use of cumulative CPI in major defense acquisition 
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programs is to calculate the Estimate at Complete (EACCPI) of a particular program. The 
EACCPI is the estimated final cost of a program and has shown to be “the reasonable 
lower bound to the final cost of a defense contract” (Christensen, 1996: 7). This shows 
CPI can be used to provide a good estimate on the minimum likely lowest cost for a 
project and can help calculate what the entire project will cost the DoD at completion.  
Schedule Efficiency Metric: SPI 
SPI is the other measure of efficiency and is found by dividing BCWP by BCWS 
as shown in Table 1 above (DCMA, 2019).  SPI is best used to determine when 
performance of a contract is declining (Abba, 2008: 29). An SPI below 1.0 indicates the 
program is behind schedule, while an SPI above 1.0 indicates the program is ahead of 
schedule. A program with an SPI of 1.0 is exactly on schedule. SPI and SV are used less 
often than CPI and other measures of efficiency and effectiveness due to issues with the 
mathematical calculations and result terms (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000; Lipke, 
2003). SV and SPI give results in terms of dollars whereas schedule deviations being 
stated in units of time would be more meaningful for assessing the program’s 
performance (Lipke, 2003). Additionally, because calculations for SV and SPI use 
budgeted numbers, SPI will always converge back to 1 at the end of the project, meaning 
even when a project finishes late, SPI will not show a schedule deficiency (Fleming and 
Koppelman, 2000; Lipke, 2003). These weaknesses led to data being examined through 
other methods such as Earned Schedule (ES) and schedule stability which will be 
examined later in this literature review. 
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CPI Stability and the Stability Rule 
While CPI stability has been discussed by EVM practitioners and others since the 
late 1970s (Christensen and Payne, 1992; Petter, 2014), documented research into CPI 
stability was not conducted until 1990 when Kirk Payne and David Christensen began 
examining 26 Contract Performance Reports (CPRs) for seven different aircraft 
procurement contracts from the database of the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) 
(Payne, 1990: 13). Using the definition that CPI stability occurs when the CPI of a 
project remains within a range of less than 0.20 from the point of stability to the end of 
the project, their research found stability occurred at the 20 percent completion point 
(Payne, 1990). These results spurred further research into this area of study and led to 
what we know today as the modern “stability rule.” Their research also showed 53% of 
programs exhibiting range stability at the 0% completion mark (Christensen and Payne, 
1992). 
 The modern stability rule originated from A Review of Cost Performance Index 
Stability, by Scott Heise with guidance from Christensen (Heise, 1991). Using the same 
range of 0.20, Heise and Christensen were able to find stability in the cumulative CPI of 
155 contracts from the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database with a 
95% confidence interval (Christensen and Heise, 1993). An important note on their 
research is that generalizability to all EVM programs cannot be assumed. In 2008, 
Henderson and Zwikael examined a dataset of 45 small non-DoD projects dealing with 
information technology and construction in the United Kingdom, Israel, and Australia. 
Their findings, using the interval definition of stability where the difference between the 
final cumulative CPI and the cumulative CPI at the 20% complete point is no more than 
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plus or minus 0.1, showed that the contracts did not stabilize by the 20% complete point, 
but in fact, “the stability is usually achieved very late in the project life cycle, often later 
than 80 percent complete for projects in these samples” (Henderson and Zwikael, 2008, 
p. 9). Abba (2008) challenged these findings, stating that Henderson and Zwikael “did 
not use comparable criteria to select contracts from the same source data” and that the 
primary data had “no evidence that these disparate projects implemented EVM 
consistently, as on DoD contracts,” (Abba, 2008: 30). While the research of Henderson 
and Zwikael (2008) was critiqued due to the selected data by Abba (2008), these findings 
still highlight the need for further research in investigating the applicability of the 
stability rule in other areas.  
Given the conflicting stability definitions and results from Christensen and Heise 
(1993) and Henderson and Zwikael (2008), Petter, Ritschel, and White (2015) examined 
209 development and production contracts in the DoD from 1987 to 2012 with the goal 
of identifying the most useful definition of CPI stability in the EVM realm. When using 
the range definition, their results were consistent with past research and the modern 
stability rule discussed previously. However, they found merit in the argument that CPI 
stabilizes later when using the interval definitions. Based on the research, they concluded 
that “the question of stability, then, is intricately tied to the definition used” (Petter et al., 
2015). With this conclusion in mind, Petter et al. recommended the absolute interval 
definition to provide an easier to understand and more conservative final estimate. 
Expanding on the research performed by Petter et al. (2015) and Henderson and 
Zwikael (2008), Clayson and Thal (2018) examined monthly EVM data for 136 
environmental remediation projects from a United States federal agency in fiscal years 
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2012 and 2013. Using the absolute interval method from Henderson and Zwikael (2008), 
their findings showed CPI stability occurred in the contracts at a median of 41% complete 
point. Using the range method discussed previously and the null hypothesis being that 
environmental remediation projects follow the 20 percent stability rule, the resulting p-
value was 0.0059. With the null hypothesis rejected, one can conclude environmental 
remediation projects do not follow the 20 percent CPI stability rule (Clayson, et al., 
2018). After testing the data with both the interval method and the final range method, 
Clayson et al. (2018) preferred the interval method as it is the “Most useful method for an 
analyst or manager to evaluate CPI stability for current projects as the other methods 
require knowing the final CPI or some unknown future CPI value to determine stability” 
(Clayson, et al., 2018). 
To summarize the literature, the CPI stability rule has been interpreted many 
different ways since its inception by Christensen and Heise in 1990. This rule of thumb 
was questioned by Henderson and Zwikael in early 2008, but that refutation was 
challenged by Abba in the latter part of 2008. Since then, Petter et al. (2015) have done 
extensive research into the different types of interpretations, concluding the absolute 
interval definition is the recommended definition because it is easier to understand and 
more conservative, both characteristics that are important to program offices as they 
examine the performance of contracts. Clayton et. al (2018) used the absolute interval 
definition of stability discussed in Petter et al. (2015) paper to conclude environmental 
remediation projects become stable at 41% rather than 20% as previously thought. While 
the research on CPI stability using EMV data has been valuable, cost is not the only part 
of a project that has an impact on how successful a project is judged. Stability, such as 
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that found in man-hours (a proxy for cost) or in schedule, can also be analyzed through 
different types of data other than EVM. This research will approach stability from the 
consideration of both cost and schedule and will use DoD software projects as the focus 
point. 
SPI Stability 
While much research has been done into CPI stability, the literature is sparse with 
analysis on SPI or schedule stability. When analyzing SPI stability, Earned Schedule (ES) 
analysis is typically employed to create a metric called SPI(t); this metric is calculated by 
converting EVM data to a time-based variance instead of dollar based while utilizing the 
BCWP and BCWS data from traditional SPI calculations (Lipke, 2003). Henderson and 
Zwikael (2008) analyzed forty-five overseas information technology and construction 
projects using the ES technique and found that, similar to their CPI stability findings, 
SPI(t) stability did not occur by the 20% complete point (Henderson and Zwikael, 2008). 
Petter et al. (2015) examined the potential existence of SPI(t) stability in DoD acquisition 
programs and found SPI(t) stability behaves very similar to CPI when using the range 
definition but stabilizes later when using the interval definition of stability (Petter et al., 
2015). 
Non-EVM Stability Research 
As mentioned previously, using EVM data is not the only way to measure 
stability. Another way to look at scheduling for software programs is to distribute 
software development efforts across a generalized software development life cycle. The 
conventional industry rule-of-thumb is 15 to 20 percent toward requirements, 15 to 20 
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percent toward analysis and design, 25 to 30 percent toward construction (coding and unit 
testing), 15 to 20 percent toward system-level testing and integration, and 5 to 10 percent 
toward transition (Borysowich, 2005). Yang (2008) found that factors such as 
development type, software size, and team size have visible impacts on effort distribution 
patterns, showing that a generalized effort distribution pattern has its’ benefits, but 
identifying certain factors before beginning a project can have cost benefits (Yang, 2008). 
Absent of EVM data, Congress has used Nunn-McCurdy thresholds to measure 
cost growth of DoD programs for nearly 30 years. The Nunn-McCurdy Act was signed 
into law in 1982, requiring the DoD to report to Congress whenever a Major Defense 
Acquisition Program (MDAP) experiences cost growth in excess of certain thresholds 
(Schwartz, 2010). Table 2 shows the thresholds currently in use by Congress. In the event 
of a critical breach, the Secretary of Defense is required to conduct a root-cause analysis 
on the program in question. The research in this thesis will be using the Original Baseline 
Estimate Breach levels as a basis for stability. 
Table 2. Nunn-McCurdy Breach Thresholds 
 Significant Breach Critical Breach 
Current Baseline Estimate ≥15% ≥25% 
Original Baseline Estimate ≥30% ≥50% 
Stability Conclusion 
EVM plays a crucial role in project management and relies heavily on the use of 
efficiency measures like CPI and SPI. CPI stability and, to a lesser extent, SPI(t) stability 
is used by the EVM community with different interpretations depending on the desired 
use of the results. Other forms of analysis can be used depending on the data available 
and questions asked.  
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Software Background 
This section explains the literature and background information regarding the 
history and modern uses of different software development methods. First, an 
introduction of which developmental methods are modernly used is discussed. Then, 
historical uses of Plan Driven methodologies in the DoD such as Waterfall are presented. 
Finally, current and future uses in the DoD of methodologies such as Agile and 
DevSecOps will be explored. Although Plan Driven methodologies have been around for 
quite some time, research on how difference methodologies impact schedule and 
manhour stability is slim. This research intends to fill that gap in the literature.  
Importance of Software 
With the United States being increasingly reliant on software to execute both 
missions abroad and to manage the day to day operations of the largest defense enterprise 
in the world, the ability to continuously develop and utilize software in new and 
innovative ways is central to national defense (McQuade, 2019). This requires attacking 
the ever-changing threats to the United States with multiple different software 
methodologies to capture the best response to each issue (McQuade, 2019). Examining 
the growth in Source Lines of Code (SLOC) from the F-16A in 1974 to the latest batch of 
F-35s shown in Figure 1 below, shows an increase of the mean from 135 thousand SLOC 
to a projected 29.5 million SLOC, further underscoring the importance of using the 
proper methodology for each software project (Defense Science Board, 2018). This 
literature review will discuss software developmental methods that are currently in use by 
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the DoD as well as explore newer models that the DoD is transitioning to in an attempt to 
maintain their competitive advantage in the realm of software. 
 
Figure 1. DoD Software Complexity and Growth: Explosive Growth of Source Lines of 
Code (SLOC) in Avionics Software (Defense Science Board, 2018). 
Software Developmental Methods 
Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) models can be broken up into two 
clusters depending on how document-oriented and rigid the methodologies are. Plan 
Driven models, like Waterfall, Evolutionary, Spiral, Iterative, and Incremental all share 
the common traits of being highly documented, rigid in how they proceed from one stage 
to another, and typically take months to years to move from one stage to another (Akbar, 
Jun and Khan, 2018). Agile models, like Scrum, Extreme Programming (XP), and 
Dynamic System Development Method (DSDM) thrive by being flexible and rely on tacit 
knowledge, are less documented, and move from one state to another in short iterations 
called sprints which typically last no more than two to four weeks at a time (Akbar et al., 
2018). For the purposes of this research, Agile methods will be grouped together. 
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Software industries select their development approach based on their product 
requirements, personnel, team skills, problem complexities, organizational needs, 
organization size, organizations geolocations, etc. (Chowdhury, Bhowmik, Hasan, and 
Rahim, 2017).  
Historical Uses in DoD (Plan Driven Models) 
Plan Driven Models originated in the 1970s when Winston W. Royce developed 
the Waterfall model (Matkovic and Tumbas, 2010). The Waterfall model relies on a high 
amount of documentation, clear requirements, stages that do not overlap at all, and uses 
sequential steps (Kannan, et al., 2014). The Waterfall method works best when quality is 
more important than cost or schedule or when a new version of an existing product is 
needed. The Spiral model keeps the high amount of documentation from the original 
Waterfall model, but also incorporates higher levels of risk analysis, software that is 
produced earlier in a program’s life cycle, and is good for medium to high risk programs 
where requirements are likely to change more than in a program that is using the 
Waterfall method (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015). Iterative and Incremental is the 
closest Plan Driven Model to Agile Models and works to get a prototype of the desired 
product early on to allow customers more time to fine tune their requirements before the 
product reaches its’ final build (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015). This reduces risk, allows 
more flexibility than other plan driven models, and is best for low to medium risk 
projects that need to get basic functionality to the end user earlier than in Spiral or in 
Waterfall (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015). Table 3 summarizes the strengths and 
weaknesses of common Plan Driven developmental methodologies in use today. 
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Table 3. Strengths and Weaknesses Comparison of Waterfall, Spiral, Incremental SDLC 
Models. (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015) 
Model/Feature Strengths Weaknesses When to use 
Waterfall  Easy to understand 
and implement. 
 Widely used and 
known.  
 Define before 
design, and design 
before coding.  
 Being a linear 
model, it is very 
simple to implement.  
 Works well on 
mature products and 
provides structure to 
inexperienced teams.  
 Minimizes 
planning overhead.  
 Phases are 
processed and 
completed one at a 
time. 
 All requirements 
must be known 
upfront  
 Inflexible.  
 Backing up to solve 
mistakes is difficult, 
once an application is 
in the testing stage, it 
is very difficult to go 
back and change 
something that was 
not well-thought out in 




produced at the final 
phase.  
 Client may not be 
clear about what they 
want and what is 
needed.  
 Customers may have 
little opportunity to 
preview the system 
until it may be too 
late.  
 It is not a preferred 
model for complex 
and object-oriented 
projects.  
 High amounts of risk 
and uncertainty, thus, 
small changes or 
errors that arise in the 
completed software 










very well known, 
clear, and fixed.  
 New version of 
existing product is 
needed.  
 Porting an 
existing product to 
a new platform 
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Spiral  High amount of 
risk analysis.  
 Software is 
produced early in the 
software life cycle.  




functionality can be 
added at a later date.  
 Project monitoring 
is very easy and 
effective. 
 Concerned people 
of a project can early 
review each phase 
and each loop as well 
because of rapid 
prototyping tools.  
 Early and frequent 
feedback from users  
 Suitable to develop 
a highly customized 
product.  
 Provides early 
indication of 
insurmountable risks. 
 Cost involved in this 
model is usually high.  
 Risk assessment 





makes management of 
a project very 
complex. 
 Time spent for 
evaluating risks for 
small or low-risk 
projects may be too 
large.  
 Time spent for 
planning, resetting 
objectives, doing risk 
analysis, and 
prototyping may be 
excessive.  
 Project’s success is 
highly dependent on 
the risk analysis phase. 
 For medium to 
high risk projects.  




 When significant 
changes are 
expected.  
 When users are 
not exactly sure 




 Develop high-risk 
or major functions 
first.  
 Risk is spread 
across smaller 
increments instead of 
concentrating in one 
large development.  
 Lessons learned at 
the end of each 
incremental delivery 
can result in positive 
revisions for the next 
increment.  
 Customers get 
important 
functionality early 
and have an 
opportunity to 
respond to each 
build.  
 Each release 
delivers an 
operational product. 
 Initial product 
delivery is faster.  
 Reduces the risk of 
failure and changing 
the requirements. 
 Requires good 
planning and design.  
 Requires early 
definition of a 
complete and fully 
functional system to 
allow for the 
definition of 
increments.  
 The model does not 
allow for iterations 
within each increment. 
 On low to 
medium-risk 
projects.  
 A need to get 
basic functionality 
to the market early  





 On a project with 
new technology, 
allowing the user 
to adjust to the 
system in smaller 
incremental steps 
rather than leaping 
to a major new 
product.  
 When it is high 
risky to develop 
the whole system 
at once. 
Future Uses in DoD (Agile Models) 
As previously discussed, Agile development is an umbrella term for all current 
lean and flexible methodologies in use today. Agile methodologies expanded on 
techniques used in iterative and incremental processes to increase flexibility and the 
speed in which products are delivered to consumers (Kannan, Jhajharia, and Verma, 
2014). Agile methods focus on personalizing the methods used to best suit the project 
requirements. Agile works best when customers are heavily involved in the process, a 
working prototype can be developed early in the software’s life cycle, individuals are 
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able to be highly motivated and self-organized, and the Agile team is able to adapt to 
changing requirements quickly and competently (Kannan, et al., 2014). 
Software Conclusion 
This section introduced the relevant software developmental methods to this 
research. This research will attempt to fill the literature gap on the impact of these 
different software methodologies on cost and schedule stability. This is an important gap 
to fill as software is becoming increasingly important in defense acquisition program 
success or failure. 
Critical Success Factors Background 
A critical success factor (CSF) is a high-level goal that is imperative for a 
business to meet. CSF’s are factors that must be vital to the organization’s success, 
beneficial to the company or department, be synonymous with a high-level goal, and link 
directly to the business strategy (Vanderbyl and Kobelak, 2007). Factors will vary across 
businesses and industries; however, the identification of them is essential to maintaining 
focus for the duration of a project. CSFs are used in this research to formulate the 
independent variables for analysis of cost and schedule stability in software CSCIs.  This 
segment of the literature review is broken down into three sections: CSFs as they relate to 
military projects in general, CSFs in software specific applications, and CSFs as they 
relate to the civilian sector.  
Military Projects 
Critical success factors in defense development projects historically revolved 
around five key criteria: 
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Table 4. Critical Success Factors in Defense Development Projects (Tishler, Dvir, 
Shenhar and Lipovetsky, 1996) 
1. The more critical the perceived need, the greater chance of success 
2. Amount of customer follow-up 
3. Clear and reasonable scope 
4. Clear requirements early in the project 
5. Professional qualifications and high motivation of the development team 
These CSFs were found by analyzing 110 defense projects executed in the 1980s and 
1990s. 20 measures of success were derived for each project with the above five being 
the most common. (Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar and Lipovetsky, 1996) As will be seen below, 
with slight differences, these CSFs have significant overlap with software projects today. 
Software Specific 
According to Nasir and Sahibuddin (2011), there are 26 critical success factors 
that influence the successful completion of software projects. Of these, five were 
observed in more than 50% of the researched literature. They are:  
Table 5. Critical Success Factors in Software (Nasir and Sahibuddin, 2011) 
 Critical Success Factors in Software Observance Frequency 
1. Clear requirements and 
specifications 
60.5% 
2. Clear objectives and goals 55.8% 
3. Realistic Schedule 53.5% 
4. An effective project manager 53.5% 
5. Support from top management 51.2% 
 
User/client involvement was 6th in number of observations, meaning all five of the CSFs 
identified from defense development projects in the 1980s-1990s are observed in the top 
CSFs for software projects from the 1990s-2010s. 
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Commercial Perspective 
In private industry, many sectors attempt to understand the vital elements required 
to maintain a successful business. Looking specifically at the biotech industry, a survey 
conducted by Vanderbyl, Kobelak, and Biotechnol (2007) analyzed 247 biotechnology 
companies across Canada documenting universal critical success factors (Vanderbyl and 
Kobelak, 2007). The top five categories of critical success factors shed light on 
influential values in the commercial sector:  
Table 6. Top Five Categories of Critical Success Factors (Vanderbyl and Kobelak, 2007) 
1. Knowledge assets including the IP and internal and external company 
databases. 
2. Use of resources from internal R&D products to entering of foreign 
markets. 
3. External environment ranging from government support, industry clusters 
to resources networking. 
4. Funding focusing on marketing conditions, management expertise, and 
development of products. 
5. Recruitment investigating the human resource issues in the nation, from 
lack of qualified candidates to available resources to compete for these 
candidates. 
In a more specific examination of software specific projects, Sudhakar (2011) 
attempts to synchronize the values essential to an effective software project. The main 
objective of Sudhakar’s (2011) article is to attempt to identify the critical success factors 
which are essential to any software development projects. He identifies the following CSFs: 
Table 7. Critical Success Factors Essential to Any Software Development Project 
(Sudhakar, 2011) 
1. Communication in project 2. Quality control 
3. Top management support 4. Client acceptance 
5. Clear project goals 6. Accuracy of output 
7. Reliability of output 8. Reduce ambiguity 
9. Project planning 10. Maximize stability 
11. Teamwork 12. Realistic expectations 
13. Project team coordination 14. User involvement. 
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Project management, product, team, and communication factors are also identified as 
important categories of success factors for software projects (Sudhakar, 2011). The 
author recognizes that there must be flexibility in determining how these factors can be 
applied to specific projects; however, he highlights that every attempt must be made to 
keep each of these concepts in mind for the duration of the work.  
In 2018, Garousi, Tarhan, Pfahl, Coşkunçay, and Demirörs applied an empirical 
approach to identifying which CSF’s are the most pertinent to a project’s success 
(Garousi, Tarhan, Pfahl, Coşkunçay and Demirörs, 2018). The empirical analysis was 
based on the data via an online questionnaire-based survey in the Turkish software 
industry, in which the dataset included data from 101 software projects. They found that 
the top three CSF’s are: (1) project team’s experience with the software development 
methodologies, (2) project team’s expertise with the task, and (3) project monitoring and 
controlling (Garousi, et al., 2018). They recognize that this work can be useful for 
software managers at all levels to help prioritize the improvement opportunities within 
their respective organizations.  
Also in 2018, Lavazza, Morasca, and Tosi examined what CSFs impact 
productivity in commercial software programs. Specifically, they examined the impact of 
the primary programming language on new and enhancement software projects. This 
study found that programming language had a statistically significant impact on 
productivity for new programs but did not for enhancement programs (Lavazza, et al., 
2018). While stability is not the same as productivity, examining the primary 
programming languages for the CSCIs in this dataset could provide program managers 
another tool to improve cost and schedule stability in their programs. 
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Critical Success Factors Conclusion 
While critical success factors vary across organizations, they remain important to 
identify and manage successfully to ensure timely completion of a project. Successful 
software programs, whether defense oriented or civilian, share commonalities in the CSF 
identified. The CSFs identified through this literature review will be utilized in this 
research to examine cost and schedule stability properties in defense software programs 
at the CSCI level. 
Chapter Summary 
EVM is a critical tool that can be used to explore when a program stabilizes in 
cost and schedule, but it is not the only method to look at stability research.  A sizeable 
body of literature shows that stability occurs and that it can be measured in numerous 
ways. Examining the various software developmental methodologies (plan driven vs. 
agile) and their impact on cost and schedule stability will fill a current gap in the 
literature. Additionally, through the identification of CSFs in this literature review, 
testable independent variables can be incorporated into the stability models utilized in 
this research.  The next chapter will discuss in more detail the methodological approach 




III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 3 provides detailed information about the data and the methodology 
utilized to analyze the data. First, it explains the source of the data, characteristics of the 
data, and discussion on what data from the initial dataset is excluded. Next, this chapter 
explains the definition of stability that will be used to determine whether a CSCI is 
defined as “stable” or “unstable” for our analysis. Then, we outline the hypothesis testing 
we utilize in our comparison analyses between software developmental methodologies. 
Finally, program critical success factors are identified and incorporated as variables in the 
contingency table analysis to test their impact on the existence of stability in software 
DoD programs at the CSCI level. 
Data 
Data for this analysis comes from the Defense Automated Cost Information 
Management System (DACIMS). DACIMS is nested inside the Cost Assessment Data 
Enterprise (CADE) database which is the central repository for Software Resource Data 
Reports (SRDRs) as well as other datasets. SRDRs capture software effort, size, and 
schedule metrics for usage as historical reference points in future cost estimates and 
enterprise resource planning efforts (OSD CAPE, 2019). SRDRs are reported by 
contractors for all major software development contracts in Acquisition Category I and 
IA programs, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), and Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS) programs following Milestone A (OSD CAPE, 2019). 
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The initial dataset consists of 4499 SRDRs spanning from Jan 2001 to Oct 2019, 
representing a broad range of programs at the CSCI level across numerous platform 
types. In order to provide repeatable analysis in the future, the SRDR Verification and 
Validation (V&V) Guide steered the selection criteria from initial to final dataset. To 
create a dataset suitable for growth analysis, the dataset must exhibit three main criteria. 
First, each data point must be analyzed and tagged as “good” in accordance with 
established V&V quality tags. To receive a “good” tag, the data point must not have 
missing data, must not be an interim report with unverified hours, must have hours 
allocated at the proper level, and must not have any unverified anomalies. This removed 
3032 datapoints, leaving behind 1462. Next, each datapoint must be the first initial 
submission or final submission for a project, further reducing the testable dataset by 362 
down to 1100. Finally, each Initial SRDR must have a corresponding Final SRDR, 
culminating in the final growth analysis dataset of 335 datapoints. A further 30 datapoints 
were removed before schedule stability analysis due to an analysis of peak staff and hours 
resulting in an impossible schedule tag being applied by the SRDR V&V Guide 
(Lanham, et al., 2018). Table 8 depicts the exclusion criteria and accompanying number 












Initial Data Set 0 4499 
Any data point not reaching the acceptable level to be good 
based on V&V quality tags 
3037 1462 
Any data point that is not an initial or final report 362 1100 
Any data point that does not have a data pair 
-- 335 Data Points is the starting point for Man Hours Analysis 
665 335 
Any data point with the impossible schedule tag 27 308 
3 more added to IS tag due to further analysis 
-- 305 Data Points is the starting point for Schedule Months 
Analysis 
3 305 
Further Inclusion/Exclusions based on specific RQ needs   
Stability Determination 
The initial stability analysis is performed in two parts. The Man-Hours variable 
will be used as a proxy for cost analysis while the Schedule-Months variable will be used 
for schedule analysis. Prior stability research has leaned on the definitions of stability 
used by Christensen (Christensen, 1993). These definitions were created using EVM data. 
Because of the lack of EVM data available for DoD software programs, SRDR data was 
used instead, resulting in a new definition of stability needing to be created. This 
definition must be usable when an analyst only has the initial and final reports for a 
program available. Of Christensen’s definitions for stability, only the range stability rule, 
which states a program is stable if the CPI at the point of stability is within 0.1 +/- of the 
final CPI, could potentially be used as a starting analogous definition for this research.  
Stability for both dependent variables, Schedule-Months and Man-Hours, is 
calculated by using the formula  
 
 
− 1. To determine stability without EVM 
data, the Nunn-McCurdy Act thresholds are used. The specific Nunn-McCurdy 
thresholds employed are a 30% change +/- for a Significant Breach and a 50% change +/- 
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for a Critical Breach. CSCIs that fall within these thresholds are deemed stable and 
datapoints that fall outside the thresholds are deemed unstable. 335 datapoints are used 
for the cost stability analysis and 305 datapoints are used for the schedule stability 
analysis. As explained in Table 1, the difference of 30 datapoints in the respective 
analyses is due to the Impossible Schedule tag. 
Data Characteristics for Software Development Methods Comparison 
The impact of software development methods on cost and schedule stability is the 
next part of the analysis. To accomplish this requires further delineation of the data. Two 
types of analyses are completed: 1) an “Upper Group” comparison of Agile to Plan 
Driven methods and 2) a “Subgroup” analysis of Agile, Evolutionary, Incremental, 
Iterative, Spiral, and Waterfall methods. Plan Driven methodologies encompassed any 
methodology that developed software in a sequential manner rather than an iterative 
manner such as Agile. The Subgroup analysis contains any methodology identified in the 
SRDR with an N of five or more that only used one software methodology. 
Table 9 provides an overview of the characteristics of the datapoints in the final 
SRDR Dataset used for this portion of the research. The cost stability dataset consists of 
335 datapoints, 18 used Agile and 308 used Plan Driven methodologies. When analyzing 
whether software methodology impacted the likelihood of a CSCI showing cost stability 
throughout its lifecycle, nine datapoints were removed from the Upper Group analysis 
due to the CSCI using a combination of Agile and Plan Driven methodologies in their 
project. A total of 30 datapoints were removed from the Subgroup cost stability analysis 
due to the CSCIs in question using a combination of different software methodologies. 
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For the Upper Group and Subgroup analysis using the Schedule Months variable, seven 
and 27 datapoints respectively were removed.  






 Starting Datapoints 335 305 
 Upper Group Breakdown 
 Agile 18 16 
 Plan Driven 308 282 
 Unfit for Analysis 9 7 
 Subgroup Breakdown 
 Agile 18 16 
 Evolutionary 5 5 
 Incremental 81 71 
 Iterative 42 35 
 Spiral 59 56 
 Waterfall 100 95 
 Unfit for Analysis 30 27 
Comparative Analysis of Software Developmental Methods 
The premise of research question two is to determine whether the various 
software developmental methods have statistically significant differences in cost or 
schedule stability. To answer these questions, several statistical tests, such as the Shapiro-
Wilk, Kruskal-Wallis, and Steel-Dwass tests are used to analyze the data through 
hypothesis testing. The Shapiro-Wilk test is used to determine normality for both the 
Man-Hours and Schedule-Months dependent variables, leading to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that normality existed within these two populations. With the assumption of 
normality being rejected, non-parametric testing is used to test for relations between the 
Man-Hours variable and each examined category. These non-parametric tests are 
repeated for the Schedule-Months variable and each examined category. The Kruskal-
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Wallis test is used to determine whether compared category locations were statistically 
significantly different from one another. Finally, for the categories that showed 
statistically significantly different locations, the Steel-Dwass test was used to identify 
which compared medians were statistically different from one another. 
Contingency Table Analysis 
For the third and final research question, the impact of independent variables from 
the dataset on the dependent variables, Man-Hours, and Schedule-Months, is tested. This 
will be done through the use of contingency tables for each dependent variable. A two-
way contingency table is used to show the relationship between two categorical variables 
based on the data observed. When determining statistical significance for the contingency 
table analysis, the chi-square distribution is used. Each test will use a 2x2 table and 
utilizes the same hypothesis test. The null hypothesis will be that the two classifications 
are independent while the alternative hypothesis will be that the two classifications are 
dependent. A failure to reject the null means the two variables are not statistically related 
to each other. A rejection of the null shows a statistical dependency between them and 
will be further examined. The two-way contingency analysis examines the variables 
listed below in Table 10.  
Table 10. Independent Variables Examined 
Potential Independent Variables Source/Data Location 
Requirements Volatility Initial CSF Lit/SRDR Dataset 
Requirements Volatility Filtered CSF Lit/SRDR Dataset 
New/Upgrade SRDR Dataset 
Contractor SRDR Dataset 
Team Experience Level CSF Lit/SRDR Dataset 
Service SRDR Dataset 
Programming Language SRDR Dataset 
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The initial amount of datapoints used for contingency analysis remained 335 for Man-
Hours and 305 for Schedule-Months. Remaining datapoints with the Impossible Schedule 
tag were removed from the dataset in between analysis for Man-Hours and Schedule-
Months for each independent variable analysis.  
For Requirements Volatility, analysis was done two ways. In both, 42 datapoints 
were removed from analysis due to having no requirement volatility data. Then, for the 
first requirements volatility analysis, the remaining datapoints were recoded as such: 
nominal was coded as 0, very low as 1, low as 2, medium as 3, high as 4, and very high 
as 5. This resulted in an analysis of 293 datapoints for Man-Hours and 270 for Schedule-
Months. The second requirements volatility analysis removed any datapoint without a 
cardinal number resulting in 231 datapoints for Man-Hours and 213 for Schedule-
Months.  
The New/Upgrade variable describes whether the CSCI is in a New program or 
one going through an Upgrade. The New/Upgrade variable required removal of seven 
datapoints due to those datapoints being coded as both New and Upgrade, leaving 328 
datapoints for Man-Hours and 303 for Schedule-Months. For the Contractor variable, no 
datapoints required removal.  
For the Team Experience Level variable, 55 were removed for no data and 
improper coding, leaving 280 datapoints for Man-Hours and 258 for Schedule-Months. 
These datapoints were put onto a 1-5 scale and bucketed as Low, Average, and High for 
1-2.99, 3-4, and 4.01-5 scale, respectively.  
For the Service variable, one datapoint was removed due to the Marines only 
having one datapoint. This left 334 datapoints for Man-Hours and 304 for Schedule 
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Months. Lastly, the Programming Language had 14 datapoints removed due to datapoints 
with multiple primary coding language being used or improper coding. This left 321 for 
the Man-Hours variable and 291 for the Schedule-Months variable. Table 11 provides an 
overview of the datapoints in the final SRDR Dataset used for this portion of the 
research. 













42 293 270 
Requirements Volatility 
Filtered 
104 231 213 
New/Upgrade 7 328 303 
Contractor 0 335 305 
Team Experience Level 55 280 258 
Service 1 334 304 
Programming Language 14 321 291 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviewed the methodological approach to analyzing the SRDR 
dataset. The discussion of the data and data characteristics offers insights into how and 
why the dataset used for this research provided an effective basis for research into cost 
and schedule stability. Next, the definition of what constitutes “stable” and “unstable” 
CSCIs in our analysis was explained. Then, categories and sub-categories used for 
comparison analysis were highlighted to capture the intent of the research. The following 
chapter will provide a detailed look at the results and analysis of the hypothesis testing 
used for research question two and the comparative analysis process used for research 
question three. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results from applying the Chapter III methods and is 
broken down into three sections, mirroring the research questions posed in Chapter I. The 
first section provides an overview of the dataset and then categorizes each software CSCI 
as stable or unstable. The second section examines the impact software methodology has 
on the presence of schedule and cost stability in the dataset. The final section analyzes 
which independent variables have statistically significant impacts on the existence of 
stability in the Man-Hours and Schedule-Months dependent variables. 
Data Characteristics 
All data utilized in the statistical analysis conducted in this research was gathered 
from the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE) system from Software Resource Data 
Reports (SRDRs). Table 12 depicts the exclusion criteria and accompanying number of 
datapoints utilized for the research. 





Initial Data Set 0 4499 
Any data point not reaching the acceptable level to be good 
based on V&V quality tags 
3037 1462 
Any data point that is not an initial or final report 362 1100 
Any data point that does not have a data pair 
335 Data Points is the starting point for Man Hours Analysis 
665 335 
Any data point with the impossible schedule tag 27 308 
3 more added to IS tag due to further analysis 
305 Data Points is the starting point for Schedule Months 
Analysis 
3 305 
Further Inclusion/Exclusions based on specific RQ needs   
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Existence of Stability 
The initial analysis focused on what constitutes stability in CSCIs that use SRDR 
as well as what percentage of CSCIs can be considered “stable” and “unstable” for the 
extent of this research. The number of stable CSCIs differed depending on what 
definition of stability was used. Without the existence of EVM data for this dataset, the 
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds of 30% and 50% respectively for Significant and Critical 
Breaches are used. Descriptive statistics show what number of CSCIs show stability with 
the two thresholds above. In total, 130 of the 335 CSCIs examined for Man-Hours 
stability and 156 of the 305 CSCIs for Schedule-Months did not meet the threshold for a 
Significant Breach. 175 of the 335 CSCIs examined for Man-Hours stability and 219 of 
the 305 CSCIs for Schedule-Months did not meet the threshold for a Critical Breach. 
Table 13 shows the number and percentage of CSCIs that show stability for each 
Dependent Variable. 







Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 130 38.80 
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach 175 52.24 
Schedule-Months 
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 156 51.15 
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach 219 66.56 
 
When looking at the distribution of stability for the Man-Hours dependent variable, the 
data is mostly normally distributed outside of the large amount of CSCIs showing more 
than triple their initial man hours used estimations. In Figure 2, the green bars show 
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CSCIs that did not have a Significant Breach in stability while the yellow bars show ones 
that did not have a Critical Breach. 
 
Figure 2. Man-Hours Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds 
Figure 3 shows the same analysis for the Schedule-Months dependent variable. A key 
difference between the two variables for the presence of stability lies in the CSCIs that 
finished ahead of schedule or cost. For Man Hours, 23 CSCIs were “unstable” but 
actually finished under budget for their man hours estimations. For Schedule-Months, 
this drops to only four CSCIs or 1.3%. Again, in Figure 3 below, the green bars represent 
stable CSCIs without Significant Breach while the yellow ones show ones that did not 
have a Critical Breach. 
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Figure 3. Schedule-Months Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds 
Results of the Comparative Analysis of Software Developmental Methods 
Research question one provided a definition of stability for the examined CSCIs. 
The next step in the research was to determine if the software developmental method 
used for the CSCI had any impact on the existence of this stability. This was done by first 
testing for normality in the two dependent variables with the Shapiro Wilk test. The 
Shapiro Wilk test and corresponding outputs are shown in Figure 4. With neither 
dependent variable showing normality at an alpha level of 0.05, non-parametric tests 




Figure 4. Shapiro Wilk Output 
The first two Rank Sum tests ran between each dependent variable and the Upper-Level 
group did not show a statistically significant difference between software methodologies 
at an alpha level of 0.05 as shown in Figure 5. Because non-parametric tests are being 
used to examine the dataset, the potential outlier at the top of Figure 5 would have no 
impact on the results. With Agile being the most recent software methodology of those 
examined, it was expected the results would show a difference in either cost or schedule. 
This was not the case, meaning that the benefits to using Agile methodology may lie in 
the intangibles such as customer satisfaction rather than cost or schedule.  
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Figure 5. Upper Group Output 
The Rank Sum tests at the Subgroup level found varying results for each dependent 
variable. The Subgroup analysis showed no statistically significant difference between 
any of the listed methodologies for Man-Hours as seen below in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Man-Hours Subgroup Output 
For the Schedule-Months variable, the global Kruskal-Wallis Rank Sum test found a 
statistically significant difference between software methodologies. The Steel-Dwass test 
must then be used as it preserves the familywise error rate (Type 1) and provides accurate 
p-values. The Steel-Dwass test did not find a statistically significant difference between 
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methodologies at an alpha level of 0.05, but it did find differences at an alpha level of 
0.1. These p-values are circled in red in Figure 7 below. The four highlighted p-values 
show that while Agile is comparable to most Plan Driven methodologies in terms of 
Schedule Stability, statistically significant differences do exist within the Plan Driven 
subgroup. 
 
Figure 7. Schedule-Months Subgroup Output 
Contingency Table Analysis 
A 2x2 contingency table analysis is used to examine relationships between two 
variables. Significant Relationships are identified when Pearson’s chi-squared test 
statistic has a p-value of less than 0.10. The null hypothesis of Pearson’s chi-squared test 
is that the two classifications are independent. If there is a failure to reject the null, the 
two variables are not statistically related to one another. If the null is rejected, then the 
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variables are dependent, and a statistical relationship exists between them. The existence 
of spurious relationships is possible when analyzing these results. A spurious relationship 
occurs when the two variables are associated, but not causally related. This can be caused 
by unknown mediating variables. Therefore, only highly significant results with a p-value 
of less than 0.01 are further analyzed while the other significant variables are observed 
only as potential findings. 
 The dataset analyzed consisted of two variables of interest, Man-Hours and 
Schedule-Months, as well as 31 categorical dummy variables. For the contingency table 
analysis performed on the Man-Hours variable, three variables were significant at an 
alpha of 0.10, four at an alpha of 0.05, and one at an alpha of 0.01. The full set of test 
results can be seen in Table 14 below. 
Table 14. Man-Hours Significant Contingency Tables 




New/Upgrade   
Req Volatility Initial 0   
Req Volatility Initial 1   
Req Volatility Initial 2   
Req Volatility Initial 3   
Req Volatility Initial 4   
Req Volatility Initial 5   
Req Volatility Filtered 0   
Req Volatility Filtered 1   
Req Volatility Filtered 2   
Req Volatility Filtered 3   
Req Volatility Filtered 4   
Req Volatility Filtered 5   
Contractor Bae Systems   











Contractor Raytheon   
Team Experience Level 
Low 
** ** 
Team Experience Level 
Average 
**  
Team Experience Level 
High 
  
Service Air Force   
Service Army *  























*       p-value < 0.10 
**     p-value < 0.05 
***   p-value < 0.01 
 
 
Table 14 test results suggest that whether a CSCI is New or an Upgrade has no significant 
impact on whether the program at the CSCI level will stay on budget. These results also 
suggest that, regardless of which way requirement volatility is calculated (Requirement 
Volatility Initial or Requirement Volatility Filtered), it has no significant relationship 
with the cost stability of the SRDR CSCIs in question. When observing the relationship 
between the contractor overseeing the program and the cost stability of said program at 
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the CSCI level, three contingency tests showed significance, with one of them flagging at 
an alpha level of 0.01. The test for Lockheed Martin suggests a CSCI is more likely to 
finish within 30% of the initial Man-Hours budget when Lockheed Martin is the lead 
contractor. The contingency test for General Dynamics suggests a CSCI is less likely to 
finish without a Significant Breach in Man-Hours if General Dynamics is the lead 
contractor. When expanding that test to include Critical Breaches, the Chi Square test 
statistic becomes highly significant at an alpha level of 0.01 as shown in Figure 8 below. 
The odds ratio indicates that given the program is managed by General Dynamics, the 
odds of the program at the CSCI level finishing with a Critical Breach in Man-Hours is 
2.8 times higher than if the program is managed by any other contractor.  
 
Figure 8. Critical Breach Man-Hours by Contractor General Dynamics 
Examining the team experience level tests, three variables were significant at a 
0.05 alpha level. The results suggest that teams with a low average experience level are 
more likely to finish without a Significant or a Critical Breach in Man Hours. This may 
be because a less experienced team is likely expected to take longer to complete similar 
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tasks as a more experienced team This would mean the less expected teams would have 
more flex room in their initial man hours estimates and finish within their expected man 
hours estimate more often. The results for when a team has an average experience level 
support this conclusion as well, as a team with average experience is less likely to finish 
within 30% of their expected Man-Hour budget. When looking at the results for the 
Service variable, they indicate a CSCI is less likely to finish without a Significant Breach 
in Man-Hours if Army is the branch in charge. Lastly, a CSCI that is programming in C 
instead of other programming languages is less likely to finish without a Significant 
Breach in Man-Hours. 
Next, contingency table analysis is performed with the Schedule-Months variable. 
Six variables were significant at an alpha of 0.10, nine at an alpha of 0.05, and 12 at an 
alpha of 0.01. Due to the number of significant tests, the full set of test results are broken 
up by significant and critical breaches shown in Table 15 and Table 16, respectively. 
 
Table 15. Schedule-Months Significant Breach Significant Contingency Tables 
Variable Schedule-Months Significant 
Breach 
New/Upgrade  
Req Volatility Initial 0 * 
Req Volatility Initial 1 ** 
Req Volatility Initial 2  
Req Volatility Initial 3  
Req Volatility Initial 4 *** 
Req Volatility Initial 5 ** 
Req Volatility Filtered 0  
Req Volatility Filtered 1  
Req Volatility Filtered 2  
Req Volatility Filtered 3 * 
Req Volatility Filtered 4 *** 
Req Volatility Filtered 5 ** 
Contractor Bae Systems  
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Contractor Raytheon  
Team Experience Level 
Low 
*** 
Team Experience Level 
Average 
*** 
Team Experience Level 
High 
 
Service Air Force  
Service Army *** 





















*       p-value < 0.10 
**     p-value < 0.05 
***   p-value < 0.01 
 
 
Similar to the Man-Hours analysis, the New/Upgrade variable shows no significant 
relationship with the Schedule-Months Significant Breach variable, indicating the 
chances of staying on time is not impacted by what kind of CSCI you are estimating. The 
requirement volatility analysis showed similar results between the Requirement Volatility 
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Initial and Requirement Volatility Filtered variables depending on what data was being 
included in the analysis. The Requirement Volatility Initial variable included as much 
data as possible, with volatility reported in words such as very low, low, medium, high, 
and very high, being recoded as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The Requirement 
Volatility Filtered variable focused strictly on data already coded as 0,1,2,3,4, and 5. This 
resulted in 0 and 1 showing significance for Requirement Volatility Initial, 3 showing 
significance for Requirement Volatility Filtered, and 4 and 5 for both Requirement 
Volatility variables when looking at Significant Breaches in schedule. Table 9 suggests 
that a CSCI is more likely to finish on schedule if more requirement volatility is present. 
At first, this seems counter intuitive because a CSCI that is not having changing 
requirements should be more likely to understand the workload and finish on time. 
However, there are two scenarios where that might not be the case. Requirement 
volatility does not necessarily mean requirements are growing: if requirements are 
shrinking, a CSCI would have less work needed to be done, resulting in staying on 
schedule more often. Second, if a CSCI is having shifting requirements, it might be under 
intense scrutiny, resulting in higher pressure to finish on time. Conversely, CSCIs 
without changing requirements could be low priority time wise and are allowed to finish 
late. This would stand to reason why requirement volatility 4 for both variables, shown in 
Figure 9 and 10 below, show significance at an alpha level of 0.01 because those CSCIs 
would have above average volatility, but not necessarily to the point where a complete 
restart would be required. 
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Figure 9. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 4 
 
Figure 10. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 4 
When looking at Significant Breaches in schedule for the Contractor variable, only 
Boeing showed significance. Figure 11 shows Boeing is significantly more likely to 




Figure 11. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Boeing 
Next, the Team Experience Level variable found significance at an alpha level of 0.01 for 
both low and average experience levels. These two tests show opposite Fisher’s Exact 
Tests’, as seen in Figures 12 and 13. These figures show that a project is less likely to 
finish on time if a team has a low average experience level and more likely to finish on 
time if their experience level is average. Interestingly, a highly experienced team does not 
show a significant relationship with finishing on time, meaning there is no benefit in 
terms of schedule stability of having a more experienced team past a certain extent. 
 
Figure 12. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Low 
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Figure 13. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Average 
The last two variables of interest were Programming Language and Service. For 
Programming Language, only Ada showed significance at an alpha level of 0.05, but C 
slightly missed making the cut at 0.1049. These results suggested that a CSCI is less 
likely to finish without a Significant Breach in Schedule-Months if using C, but more 
likely if using the language Ada. This may be because Ada was originally created by the 
DoD, resulting in potentially more experienced Ada users than C users on DoD contracts. 
For Service, Army and Navy both showed significance at a 0.01 level with Fisher’s 
Exacts Tests’ opposite of what was seen with the Team Experience Level variable. 
Figures 14 and 15 make clear that a CSCI was more likely to finish on schedule with 
Army instead of Navy in charge.  
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Figure 14. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Service Army 
 
Figure 15. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Service Navy 
Table 16. Schedule-Months Critical Breach Significant Contingency Tables 
Variable Schedule-Months Critical 
Breach 
New/Upgrade  
Req Volatility Initial 0  
Req Volatility Initial 1 ** 
Req Volatility Initial 2 * 
Req Volatility Initial 3  
Req Volatility Initial 4 * 
Req Volatility Initial 5  
Req Volatility Filtered 0  
Req Volatility Filtered 1 ** 
Req Volatility Filtered 2  
Req Volatility Filtered 3  
Req Volatility Filtered 4 * 
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Req Volatility Filtered 5  
Contractor Bae Systems  










Contractor Raytheon  
Team Experience Level 
Low 
* 
Team Experience Level 
Average 
*** 
Team Experience Level 
High 
** 
Service Air Force  
Service Army *** 





















*       p-value < 0.10 
**     p-value < 0.05 
***   p-value < 0.01 
 
 
Similar to the findings in Table 15, Table 16 also suggests that a CSCI is more 
likely to finish on schedule if more requirement volatility is present. The tests lose 
significance when talking about Critical Breaches instead of Significant Breaches 
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regarding the Requirement Volatility variable. The loss of significance indicates that 
observed Critical Breaches are slightly more in line with expectations, meaning volatile 
requirements would have less of an impact on schedule if one was okay with finishing 
within 50% of initial schedule estimates rather than within 30%. At an alpha level of 
0.05, the contingency test including Northrop Grumman found a project is less likely to 
finish without a Critical Breach if Northrop Grumman is the company in charge of said 
project. Boeing again showed significance at an alpha level of 0.01 as shown in Figure 
16. Lockheed Martin (see Figure 17) joined Boeing in significance at an alpha level of 
0.01. These two figures show an extremely high probability of finishing within 50% of 
initial estimates if a project has Boeing or Lockheed Martin as the lead contractor. 
Lockheed Martin did not show any relationship to the Schedule-Months Significant 
Breach variable while Boeing did. Lockheed Martin did show a relationship at the 0.10 
alpha level for Critical Breaches in cost. This means if staying on schedule was your only 
concern and all else was held constant, Boeing would be a better choice as a contractor 
but if staying on budget was a factor as well, Lockheed Martin may be the preferred 
option. 
 
Figure 16. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Boeing 
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Figure 17. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Lockheed Martin 
All three team-experience variables found some level of significance at various alpha 
levels. Like the Schedule-Months Significant Breaches, a low experienced team is less 
likely to finish on schedule while a team with an average experience level is more likely 
to finish on schedule. Teams with a high experience level also showed to be less likely to 
finish on schedule at an alpha level of 0.05. Like Table 15, the programming language 
Ada showed significance at an alpha level of 0.05, showing a CSCI is better off using 
Ada if they want to finish without a Critical Breach in Schedule-Months.  Lastly, both 
Army and Navy showed significance at an alpha level of 0.01 with opposite Fisher’s 
Exact Tests’, also like what was shown in Table 14. Figures 18 and 19 show that a 
project is less likely to finish on time if being led by the Navy and more likely to finish 
on time if led by Army. 
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Figure 18. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Service Army 
 
Figure 19. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Service Navy 
Contingency Table Analysis Summary 
 Several potential findings were examined through the results of a contingency 
table analysis. Relationships with the Man-Hours variable suggests that SRDR CSCIs are 
less likely to finish on budget with General Dynamics as the lead contractor, with an 
average experience level team, programmed in C, or if managed by the Army. SRDR are 
more likely to finish on budget if Lockheed Martin is the lead contractor or the team has 
a low level of average experience.  
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Relationships with the Schedule-Months variable suggest that SRDR CSCIs are 
less likely to finish on schedule if the team has a low level of average experience, if 
requirement volatility is low, if Northrop Grumman is the lead contractor, if the project is 
managed by Navy, or is programmed in C. SRDR CSCIs are more likely to finish on 
schedule if requirement volatility is above average, a team has average level of average 
experience, Lockheed Martin or Boeing is the lead contractor, managed by Army, or 
programmed in Ada. All other tested variables showed in insignificant relationship with 
the Man-Hours and Schedule-Months variables. 
Multivariate Analysis 
 One of the weaknesses of running a contingency table analysis is the potential of 
omitted variable bias. If there is a missing variable, such as size, that is the true driving 
factor for cost and schedule stability, not including it could lead to misleading results. 
Looking for omitted variable bias in a dataset can be done by using a correlation matrix 
with all variables and the potential omitted variable. In Table 17, Estimated Source Lines 
of Code (ESLOC) – Final is tested against all variables used in this analysis. ESLOC – 
Final is used because it is the actual lines of code used in each CSCI. If stability is more 
likely to occur in larger programs, Table 17 would show a strong correlation between any 
of the dependent variables and the ESLOC – Final variable. No dependent variable has 
more than a 0.0470 correlation with ESLOC, indicating an unsubstantial correlation 
between ESLOC and schedule or cost stability. An unsubstantial correlation is also 
shown between ESLOC and all independent variables as the highest correlation is 0.2089. 
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Table 17. ESLOC Correlation Matrix 
Dependent Variables Correlation with ESLOC - 
Final 
Stable without a Nunn-
McCurdy Significant 
Breach Man Hours 
0.0275 
Stable without a Nunn-
McCurdy Critical Breach 
Man Hours 
0.0416 
Stable without a Nunn-
McCurdy Significant 
Breach Schedule Months 
0.0275 
Stable without a Nunn-
McCurdy Critical Breach 
Schedule Months 
0.0470 
  Independent Variables 
New/Upgrade - New -0.0065 
New/Upgrade - Upgrade 0.0065 
Req Volatility Initial 0 -0.0180 
Req Volatility Initial 1 -0.1164 
Req Volatility Initial 2 0.0836 
Req Volatility Initial 3 -0.0069 
Req Volatility Initial 4 0.0479 
Req Volatility Initial 5 0.0322 
Req Volatility Filtered 0 -0.0180 
Req Volatility Filtered 1 -0.1164 
Req Volatility Filtered 2 0.0836 
Req Volatility Filtered 3 -0.0069 
Req Volatility Filtered 4 0.0479 
Req Volatility Filtered 5 0.0322 
Contractor Bae Systems 0.0144 










Contractor Raytheon 0.0808 
Team Experience Level 
Low 
0.1757 




Team Experience Level 
High 
-0.0678 
Service Air Force -0.0109 
Service Army -0.0625 



















This chapter presented the results from applying the Chapter III methods and was 
broken down into three sections, mirroring the research questions posed in Chapter I. The 
first section provided an overview of the dataset and then categorized each software 
CSCI as stable or unstable. The second section examined the impact software 
methodology has on the presence of schedule and cost stability in the dataset. The final 
section analyzed which independent variables have statistically significant impacts on the 
existence of stability in the Man Hours and Schedule Months dependent variables. The 
next chapter will further discuss these results and provide the conclusions drawn from 
this research and analysis.  
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V.  Conclusions 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter utilizes the analysis and results from the previous chapter to answer 
the initial research questions. These questions are answered through a dialogue that 
highlights their impact and potential use in current cost analysis applications. Specific 
results and findings are presented for each phase of the analysis. Finally, the limitations 
and potential future research are discussed. 
Findings 
This research originated with the purpose of filling the literature gap on stability 
in DoD software intensive programs. To do this, the definition of stability was modified 
to fit non-EVM data. This led to using Nunn-McCurdy thresholds and the two dependent 
variables, Man-Hours and Schedule-Months, as proxies for cost stability and schedule 
stability respectively. A Significant Breach occurs when a CSCI exceeds 30% of its 
initial estimate while a Critical Breach occurs when a CSCI exceeds 50% of its initial 
estimate. While finishing behind schedule or over budget is considered worse than ahead 
of schedule or under budget, any inaccuracy in budget or schedule leads to improper 
allocation of funds. Because of this, Table 17 includes all CSCIs that did not meet the 













Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 130 38.80 
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach 175 52.24 
Schedule-Months 
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 156 51.15 
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach 219 66.56 
From the table, one can tell a project is more likely to finish on time than on budget 
which makes sense as schedule slips are more easily seen than budget slips. Another 
interesting note is that only approximately 15% of CSCIs finish between 30-50% off 
schedule or budget, meaning that a majority of CSCIs are either without a Significant 
Breach in budget or schedule or they completely blow by their initial estimates. This can 
be seen in Figure 20 and Figure 21 below as the second largest bin for Man-Hours and 
the 4th largest bin for Schedule-Months is >200%. In Figure 20 below, the green bars 
show CSCIs that did not have a Significant Breach in stability while the yellow bars 
show ones that did not have a Critical Breach. 
 
Figure 20. Man-Hours Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds 
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Figure 21 shows the same analysis for the Schedule-Months dependent variable. A key 
difference between the two variables for the presence of stability lies in the CSCIs that 
finished ahead of schedule or cost. For Man Hours, 23 CSCIs were “unstable” but 
actually finished under budget for their man hours estimations. For Schedule-Months, 
this drops to only four CSCIs or 1.3%. Again, in Figure 21 below, the green bars 
represent stable CSCIs without Significant Breach while the yellow ones show ones that 
did not have a Critical Breach. 
 
Figure 21. Schedule-Months Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds 
From the figures and tables above, it can be seen that cost and schedule stability in DoD 
software intensive programs at the CSCI level does exist, but there is a large room for 
improvement in the percentage of CSCIs that are considered stable. The most comparable 
prior definition of stability is CPI Range Stability used by Christensen and Payne. CPI 
Range Stability deems a program stable if the final CPI is not more than 10% +- from the 
initial CPI. While Christensen and Payne focused on when a majority of programs 
became stable, they also included the percent of stable programs at their initial reporting 
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stage, exactly like the initial reports used in this research. Their research showed 53% of 
programs exhibiting range stability at the 0% completion mark (Christensen and Payne, 
1992). For Man-Hours, 60/335 or 17.9% of the CSCIs showed stability following the 
same Range Stability Rule. For Schedule-Months, the ratio was 84/305 or 27.5%. For 
both cost and schedule, software programs at the CSCI level show much lower levels of 
stability. The analysis conducted for research questions two and three help identify 
potential avenues to reducing the number of CSCIs finishing as unstable. 
 Plan Driven and Agile methodologies started seeing prevalent use in the military 
at different times throughout history. When analyzing the impact of different software 
developmental methodologies on cost and schedule stability, the newer methodology, 
agile in this case, would be expected to show some significant improvement on its’ 
predecessor. This was not the case, meaning that the benefits to using Agile methodology 
may lie in the intangibles such as customer satisfaction rather than cost or schedule. It is 
also possible Agile is still too new to the DoD, meaning project managers are having 
difficulty accurately predicting cost and schedule for projects that use Agile. Even though 
Agile may show comparable instability as Plan Driven methodologies currently, Agile 
may still be cheaper or faster than Plan Driven methodologies. For example, a CSCI 
using Agile that is 50% over a $100M budget would have the same instability as a CSCI 
using a Plan Driven model that is 50% over a $200M budget, but the Agile CSCI would 
cost half as much as the alternative. Further research would be needed to determine the 
potential benefits or costs of Agile over its’ counterparts.  
 While Agile and Plan Driven methodologies showed similarities, statistically 
significant differences were seen in the Plan Driven subgroup in terms of Schedule 
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Stability. Figure 22 below shows four highlighted p-values where these differences occur. 
These p-values suggest that there is a potential benefit of using certain Plan-Driven 
methodologies over others when schedule is the sole concern. The first p-value shows it 
is statistically more likely to finish on schedule when using Incremental rather than 
Iterative. The second p-value shows it is statistically more likely to finish on schedule 
when using Agile than Evolutionary. This was the only relationship to show significance 
with the Agile variable at the subgroup level. The last two p-scores show it is statistically 
more likely to finish on schedule when using Spiral rather than Iterative or Evolutionary. 
 
Figure 22. Schedule-Months Subgroup Output 
 For the third and final research question, the impact of independent variables from 
the dataset on the dependent variables, Man-Hours, and Schedule-Months, was tested. A 
contingency table analysis was used to test the relationships between these variables. The 
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independent variables were determined by looking at Critical Success Factor (CSF) 
literature in the civilian, military, and software realms as well as looking at what 
variables from the dataset would potentially be changeable by the decision makers for 
SRDR projects. Prior literature suggests clear project goals and requirements were 
essential to a project being successful (Nasir and Sahibuddin, 2011). This was not 
supported by the results of this study, with a caveat. Results showed CSCIs were less 
likely to finish on schedule with low requirement volatility. Requirement volatility did 
not have any relation with staying on budget. Prior literature also suggested that support 
from top management was as critical, if not more so, than clear requirements. This means 
the impacts of poorly defined requirements could have been mitigated by upper 
leadership being more involved with getting the project done on time. Effective and 
experienced project managers and team members were also seen as a critical factor in a 
successful project (Nasir and Sahibuddin, 2011). These finding are partially supported by 
the results of this study. With a less experienced team, a project is less likely to finish on 
time, but more likely to finish without a breach in Man Hours. With an average 
experienced team, a project is less likely to finish within the initial Man Hours estimate, 
but more likely to finish on time. This means that the person in charge of each project 
must decide whether finishing within their initial Man Hours or Schedule Months 
estimate is more important when hiring their team and hire accordingly. The relationships 
between these variables as well as the variables pulled from the data rather than the 
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Table Legend: 
Yellow = Negative Correlation, p-value < 0.10 
Orange = Negative Correlation, p-value < 0.05 
Red = Negative Correlation, p-value < 0.01 
Light Blue = Positive Correlation, p-value < 0.10 
Light Green = Positive Correlation, p-value < 0.05 
Dark Green = Positive Correlation, p-value < 0.01 
 
Relationships with the Man-Hours variable suggests that SRDR CSCIs are less 
likely to finish on budget with General Dynamics as the lead contractor, with an average 
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experience level team, programmed in C, or if managed by the Army. SRDR are more 
likely to finish on budget if Lockheed Martin is the lead contractor or the team has a low 
level of average experience. Relationships with the Schedule-Months variable suggest 
that SRDR CSCIs are less likely to finish on schedule if the team has a low level of 
average experience, if requirement volatility is low, if Northrop Grumman is the lead 
contractor, managed by Navy, or programmed in C. SRDR CSCIs are more likely to 
finish on schedule if requirement volatility is above average, a team has average level of 
average experience, Lockheed Martin or Boeing is the lead contractor, managed by 
Army, or programmed in Ada. All other tested variables showed in insignificant 
relationship with the Man-Hours and Schedule-Months variables. 
Limitations 
 The biggest limitation for this research stemmed from the lack of EVM data 
available for SRDR programs, resulting in a shift in the way the research was conducted. 
Even when shifting to SRDR data, of the 4499 CSCIs collected from CADE on SRDR 
programs, only 335 CSCIs were usable for the initial research with further reductions 
from there. These exclusions were due to lack of complete data and reporting 
inconsistencies by contractors. Furthermore, findings may be limited due to limited 
sample size of CSCIs using Agile processes. Findings may also be limited due to 
potential spurious relationships between variables with p-values between 0.1 and 
0.01.Lastly, bivariate contingency tables may result in some omitted variable biases. 
While this was addressed with the multivariate analysis looking at correlation between 
size and the examined variables, this potentially bias cannot be completely ignored. 
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Final Thoughts  
This research expanded the knowledge on stability in DoD programs while setting 
the groundwork on stability in SRDR specific programs at the CSCI level. Some 
variables like Service and New/Upgrade cannot be controlled by the project manager, but 
others are more malleable. Programming Language, Requirement Volatility, Contractor, 
and Team Experience Level are all able to be adjusted to some extent before or at the 
beginning of a project. The importance of giving each project the best chances of 
finishing on time and within budget cannot be overstated. The importance of further 
research into SRDR CSCIs is crucial based on the current lack of existing literature. If 
program offices can better grasp the program’s cost and schedule drivers at the CSCI 
level, stability at the program will also improve, saving the DoD both time and money. 
78 
Appendix – Contingency Table Analysis Results 
A contingency table analysis is used to study relationships between variables, 
identified when Pearson’s chi-squared test is significant at a p-value of less than 0.10. 

























Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 2  
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 3  
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 4  
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 1  
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 4  
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Significant Breach Man-Hours by Contractor General Dynamics  
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